Vucic Chases Premiership Amid 500,000 Missing Addresses

Serbia heads into a tight parliamentary race on October 25.

Aleksandar Vucic, who has controlled the political scene for fourteen years, is running for prime minister after stepping down as president in late September. He held the premiership from 2014 to 2017. His opponents are a coalition formed from the student protests that swept the country earlier this year. Vladimir Bilcik, a former European Parliament rapporteur for Serbia, called this the first election in over a decade with a genuinely uncertain result.

The campaign centers on doubts about the integrity of the voting process. An investigation by RFE/RL’s Balkan Service found about 500,000 registered voters lack full addresses. Many records are missing street names or house numbers. The review also identified hundreds of names listed at public facilities like social welfare centers. Other addresses appeared too small to hold the number of people assigned to them. These issues mirror problems seen in the 2023 vote, when international observers noted voter transport from Bosnia-Hercegovina and instances of intimidation.

The timing of the election adds emotional weight to the contest. It takes place days before the second anniversary of the Novi Sad tragedy. On November 1, 2024, a railway station canopy collapsed, killing sixteen people. The disaster sparked nationwide protests driven by corruption allegations at a Chinese-led construction project. The government denied wrongdoing but met demonstrations with police force and arrests. On March 15, 2025, authorities allegedly used an unlawful sonic weapon against peaceful protesters. Vucic announced his resignation and the early vote following another student protest in June.

Polls show a deep split in the electorate. The student opposition has no formal leaders. Its candidate list features nonpartisan figures, including university professors. Cardiologist Ilija Srdanovic heads the list. The movement stated that his position does not guarantee a premiership if the coalition wins power.

The government claims it fixed all issues flagged by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe after the 2023 election. An interim report from the OSCE contradicts this claim. The organization has deployed 300 observers to Serbia. RFE/RL investigations found the number of eligible voters in Bosnia and Kosovo increased before the vote. These regions are key sources of support for Vucic’s Progressive Party among ethnic Serbs. Four employees of Serbia-funded institutions in Kosovo told RFE/RL they faced pressure to vote for the ruling party. Similar pressure was documented in several Serbian municipalities.

Allegations of surveillance and arrests complicate the political climate. A statement from the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on October 21 cited reports of illegal monitoring of opposition members. Researchers from the Serbian nonprofit SHARE and Toronto University alleged that Pegasus surveillance software, which is illegal in Serbia, was used in at least sixteen cases in 2026. Government officials denied targeting political rivals. The opposition blames the authorities for the spying.

International observers note a decade-long decline in Serbian freedoms, a trend confirmed by the latest Freedom House report. Some US lawmakers warn that Moscow may play an active role in the election. The European Parliament has raised concerns about Russian influence operations. Republican Congressman Joe Wilson stated that Russia is deploying resources to monitor and disrupt Serbian citizens and the student movement. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed personal support for Vucic ahead of the vote.

Vucic pledged to maintain his foreign policy course during the campaign. He refused to follow EU calls for sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. The student movement focused on fighting corruption. It also opposed sanctions and reiterated support for Belgrade’s stance of not recognizing Kosovo's independence. Serbia’s EU integration has stalled, with no new accession chapter opened since late 2021. Democratic backsliding, unresolved relations with Kosovo, and the refusal to sanction Russia are cited as the main reasons for this impasse.